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Essays 
TRADITION AS PAST AND PRESENT IN 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS 
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT† 
ABSTRACT 
  Tradition is often understood as an inheritance from the past that 
has no connection to the present. Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court 
on both ends of the ideological spectrum work from this 
understanding, particularly in analyzing cases under the substantive 
due process clause. Some conservative Justices say that substantive 
due process protects only rights that were firmly established when the 
Constitution was ratified. In contrast, some liberal Justices dismiss 
tradition as being too stagnant and oppressive to serve as a limit on 
substantive due process rights, relying instead on contemporary 
norms and reason. Both of these approaches share an oppositional 
view of past and present, and permit little opportunity for deeper, 
searching inquiry into what liberty interests are so deeply embedded 
in this Nation’s identity that they should be protected by the U.S. 
Constitution. The Essay presents a richer, interactive understanding of 
tradition as a continuity between past and present. Tradition 
represents what elements of our evolving past we wish to own in the 
present. The Essay explores this alternative view of tradition using as 
exemplars some judicial opinions in the substantive due process area, 
largely from the Court’s center. It argues that tradition does not 
deserve a place in substantive due process analysis simply because it 
represents a fixed truth from some distant past, nor should tradition 
be entirely rejected as a source of substantive due process rights 
simply because of its connection to the past. Understood as a source 
of our identity that is both inherited and changing, tradition can serve 
as a constructive focal point for determining substantive due process 
rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Some political candidates speak of restoring traditional values, as 
if going backwards were a meaningful direction and could erase 
today’s undesirable social norms. Other candidates speak of 
completely changing the way we do business, as if the past could be 
swept aside and the present constructed upon a foundation 
disconnected from what has come before. These invocations have 
rhetorical power and provide a shorthand in political discourse. The 
trouble is that, in making a virtue out of distancing past from present, 
they also exaggerate divisions within current politics, discourage 
efforts to find common ground and shared commitments, and mask 
actual commitments behind rhetorical screening. 
This dichotomous way of thinking about traditional values 
operates not only in politics, but in judicial decisionmaking relating to 
individual constitutional rights. For some members of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, tradition is the only legitimate source of substantive 
due process rights; in other words, no matter how well-accepted a 
liberty or identity interest has come to be in present society, 
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substantive due process protection is not available unless the right 
was already, at some specific chronological moment, “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition.”1 Even with respect to equal 
protection rights, Justice Scalia believes that “the function of [the 
Supreme Court] is to preserve . . . society’s values . . . not to revise 
them.”2 For some other Justices, in contrast, tradition is a source of 
oppression, and thus a cause for suspicion, not constitutional 
instantiation. The opinions of Justices Brennan and Blackmun, for 
example, contend that individual rights should be identified based on 
reasoned judgment and evolving, expanding contemporary norms, 
not tradition.3 On today’s Court, Justice Ginsburg views tradition as 
oppressive, not as a source of liberty, and, for this reason, she has 
generally preferred equal protection to substantive due process for 
securing individual rights.4 
These contrary views share one point in common: that tradition 
is based only on the past and has no relation to the present. This 
Essay has a modest goal: to show that this view of tradition in 
opposition to the present is wrong, both descriptively and 
normatively. When courts and advocates reason from tradition, 
whatever they pretend to be doing, they are not in fact choosing 
between past and present, at least not to the extent, or in the way, 
claimed. Even if they could separate past and present as they claim, 
this Essay argues that to do so would eviscerate the richness of the 
historical dimension that substantive due process is intended to 
capture. 
Traditions do not exist—and should not inform existing 
constitutional law and politics—simply by virtue of their existence in 
the past. As this Essay will explain, traditions are transmitted, and 
continue only if they are accepted and carried forward from one 
generation to the next, often in revised form.5 The need for 
acceptance in the present makes tradition a choice, not a discovery of 
some objective fact or truth. Tradition represents ownership of a 
 
 1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted).  
 3. See infra notes 73, 76–97 and accompanying text.  
 4. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.  
 5. See infra Part II.  
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continuity with the past—a present authority,6 as well as a past one. It 
is not the absence of change; “the very traditionality of law ensures 
that it must change.”7 Indeed, change often strengthens, rather than 
weakens, tradition.8  
Conversely, today’s normative commitments do not spring fully 
clothed from the present. The present builds on what was transmitted, 
and received, from the past. Accordingly, change means revision, not 
creation, and is best secured on its foundations in the past—carefully 
rethought and reconsidered.9 In this important sense there is pastness 
in the present, and presence in the past.10 
I proceed in this Essay first by exploring how tradition is 
understood in some representative substantive due process opinions 
at each end of the Court’s ideological spectrum. I then sketch an 
alternative, more integrated approach to tradition and demonstrate 
the application of this approach in judicial opinions that tend to be 
associated with the Court’s “center.” The positions I explore 
correspond roughly to the different theories of constitutional 
interpretation evident in the broader arena of constitutional 
interpretation—not surprisingly, because the interpretative theories 
themselves reflect the same contrasting views of history and change. 
Originalists, who believe the Constitution should be interpreted 
according to its original meaning,11 also believe that only rights that 
existed at the time of the Framers or when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified should be protected by substantive due 
process and that present norms and circumstances are irrelevant. 
 
 6. Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHIL. 237, 240 (1986); see also id. at 250 
(“Traditions depend on real or imagined continuities between past and present.”). 
 7. Id. at 251.  
 8. See Joseph R. Gusfield, Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of 
Social Change, 72 AM. J. SOC. 351, 357–58 (1967).  
 9. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal 
Thought, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 303, 305 (“[T]he primary impulse for social change seeks 
reconciliation between the familiar and an evolving sense of what is just and good, rather than a 
radical break from the past.”).  
 10. See Krygier, supra note 6, at 256 (“Important traditions are a combination of 
inheritance and (often creative) reception and transmission.”).  
 11. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986) (“[O]riginal intent is the only legitimate basis for 
constitutional decisionmaking.”); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 631, 631 (1993) (“To interpret a document simply means to attempt to determine what 
its author or authors intended to convey.”); Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: 
Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (1992) (“Originalism is a virtual axiom of our 
legal-political system, necessary to distinguish the judicial from the legislative function.”). 
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Rationalists or perfectionists12 are not constrained by the past, favoring 
instead the use of reasoned judgment in light of today’s realities to 
extend substantive due process precedents.13 Although these 
approaches take opposite stances toward tradition, they share the 
view that answers lie either in the past or in the present, but not both. 
In contrast, common-law constitutionalists,14 Burkean minimalists,15 or 
traditional rationalists16 respect both history and reason. History is 
important—indeed, it is given a kind of presumptive weight. But it is 
not a single, unchangeable state of affairs at some single, original 
moment,17 nor is it the end of the analysis to which contemporary 
considerations and practices are irrelevant.18 
Drawing from the same view of the role of history as common-
law constitutionalists—and as a number of Justices from the Court’s 
center—I argue in this Essay that an interactive view of tradition in 
which both past and present are relevant is superior to the 
dichotomous, either/or view. It is superior not because it inevitably 
reaches “better” results, but because it builds on a more realistic view 
 
 12. The terms are used in Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 
356, 394 (2006). Professor Sunstein uses the term “perfectionists” to apply to both those on the 
right and those on the left who “want to read the Constitution in a way that fits with the most 
attractive political ideals.” Id. at 353.  
 13. For other “dynamic” theories of interpretation, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest 
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980), which argues that the Constitution’s 
“text and original history” should be given “presumptive weight” but should not be treated as 
“authoritative or binding,” id. at 205; and Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide 
for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989), which argues for “pragmatic constitutionalism” 
that considers not only Constitutional text, but also judicial precedents, American traditions, 
and contemporary social values, id. at 1104–06. 
 14. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 688 (1994) (advocating for an evolutionary 
approach to constitutional interpretation based heavily on precedent).  
 15. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 389 (advocating for “a conception of the Constitution as 
evolving in the same way as traditions and the common law—not through the idiosyncratic 
judgments of individual judges, but through a process in which social norms and practices play 
the key role”).  
 16. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877, 891 (1996) (“The central rational traditionalism idea is that one should be very careful 
about rejecting judgments made by people who were acting reflectively and in good faith, 
especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or at least accepted over time.”). 
 17. See Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—And Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 
1640 (1997) (“To assume that values articulated at the Founding should apply unchanged is to 
overlook the ways in which those values . . . may themselves have changed.”).  
 18. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[H]istory and tradition are the starting 
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” (quoting 
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (alteration in 
original)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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of tradition, encourages transparency, and focuses debate on the 
questions most relevant to substantive due process analysis. 
I.  TRADITION IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE: 
TWO OPPOSING VIEWS 
In this Part, I explore two jurisprudential viewpoints that, 
although diametrically opposed in terms of the values they adopt, 
share analytically a view of tradition as entailing the past 
disassociated from the present. I start with the view—articulated most 
forcefully by Justice Scalia—that substantive due process secures only 
those particular individual liberties that are “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition.”19 I then address the contrary view of 
tradition—reflected in different ways in the jurisprudence of Justices 
Brennan, Blackmun, and Ginsburg—as an undesirable deadweight 
that should not play a significant role in identifying fundamental 
liberty rights. 
A. Tradition as Positive, Fixed, and Limiting 
1. The Model.  The view of tradition held by the most 
conservative members of the U.S. Supreme Court is that tradition is 
discernible, fixed, and the sole source of liberty rights under 
substantive due process. In recent decades, the Justices most 
associated with this view are Justices White, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito. To these Justices, substantive due process is a very limited 
doctrine, intended only to prevent legislatures from trampling on 
individual rights that are already deeply settled in our nation’s earliest 
traditions.20 Tradition is, within this view, a limiting principle—an 
objective criterion that prevents courts from substituting their own 
subjective preferences for those of legislatures. Legislatures are free 
to depart from tradition,21 but courts are not. If a tradition was not 
 
 19. E.g., id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the Court’s function in terms of identifying suspect classes and fundamental rights 
is only to “prevent backsliding from the degree of restriction the Constitution imposed upon 
democratic government, not to prescribe, on [its] own authority, progressively higher degrees”).  
 21. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(stating that rights that are not recognized by the Court “are left to be democratically adopted 
or rejected by the people”); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The virtue of a 
democratic system with a First Amendment is that it readily enables people, over time, to be 
persuaded that what they took for granted is not so, and to change their laws accordingly.”); 
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firmly established at the time of the Framers or when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, or if a particular tradition supports a 
legislative act, the substantive due process challenge at issue fails.22 
Indeed, Justice Thomas suggests that he would support overruling 
past precedents not grounded in enumerated constitutional 
provisions.23 
An exemplar of the view of tradition as ascertainable, fixed, and 
essential to the identification of rights under substantive due process 
is Justice White’s majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick.24 The 
opinion upheld the Georgia antisodomy statute at issue in that case 
on the ground that sodomy was a criminal offense under many laws in 
effect at the time of the ratification of both the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.25 “Against this background,” Justice White 
wrote, the claim that there is a right to engage in homosexual sodomy 
is “at best, facetious.”26 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice 
Burger reinforced the reasoning of Justice White. “Decisions of 
individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state 
intervention throughout the history of Western civilization,” he 
wrote.27 “[P]roscriptions against sodomy have very ‘ancient roots’” in 
Roman law, “Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards,” and the 
common law of England.28 “To hold that the act of homosexual 
 
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (noting that states are free to repeal their laws criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy).  
 22. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117, 124, 125 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(reasoning that the California law imposing a conclusive presumption of paternity on the 
mother’s husband is “more than a century old,” that “[t]he presumption of legitimacy was a 
fundamental principle of the common law,” and that “nothing in the older sources, nor in the 
older cases, addressed specifically the power of the natural father to assert parental rights over a 
child born into a woman’s existing marriage with another man”).  
 23. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I 
write separately to note that neither party has argued that our substantive due process cases 
were wrongly decided and that the original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes 
judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision.”); cf. id. at 92 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (conceding that the Court’s prior substantive due process cases relating to 
the family have some “small claim to stare decisis” but stating that they should not be further 
extended). 
 24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
 25. Id. at 192–94, 196.  
 26. Id. at 194.  
 27. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 28. Id. at 196–97 (quoting id. at 192 (majority opinion)).  
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sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast 
aside millennia of moral teaching.”29 
In his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,30 which reversed 
Bowers, Justice Scalia built upon Justice White’s reasoning in Bowers, 
reinforcing the categorical nature of that reasoning. Rights either 
were established at the time of the Framers or the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, or they were not.31 According to Justice 
Scalia, the challenged Texas antisodomy statute was supported by a 
long history of sodomy regulation;32 the right to homosexual sodomy 
was not, and therefore could not be, a constitutionally protected 
right.33 Present circumstances were irrelevant. For Justice Scalia, it did 
not matter that antisodomy statutes generally were not enforced, that 
private attitudes toward homosexuals and homosexual sex had 
evolved since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, or that any 
other circumstances had changed. All that mattered, in his view, was 
that antisodomy statutes had a sufficiently old pedigree or, 
alternatively, that legal protection of sodomy did not. 
Because this view of tradition is designed explicitly to limit the 
ability of courts to expand individual rights,34 it ordinarily carries with 
it a preference for defining claimed rights in narrow and specific 
terms. Thus, Justice White defined the right at issue in Bowers as the 
“fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,”35 rather than 
as the more general claim to privacy in the “private, consensual 
sexual activity” identified by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting 
opinion.36 Similarly, in a challenge to a California statute that 
conclusively presumed that the husband of a married woman was her 
 
 29. Id. at 197. 
 30. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 31. See J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1613, 1616 (1990) (arguing that Justice Scalia treats traditions as coming in “discrete units 
with discrete boundaries”).  
 32. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws.” 
(quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192–93)). 
 33. Id. at 594. 
 34. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 (majority opinion) (“There should be . . . great 
resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the Due Process Clause], particularly if it requires 
redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.”). 
 35. Id. at 191.  
 36. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (identifying the issue in the case as whether 
“individuals [have] the right to decide for themselves whether to engage in particular forms of 
private, consensual sexual activity”).  
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child’s father, even against the claim of a man whose blood tests could 
establish that he was the child’s biological father, Justice Scalia 
characterized the claim narrowly, as that of an “adulterous natural 
father”37 who was asking the Court to disregard the “historic 
respect . . . traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop 
within the unitary family,”38 rather than as that of a natural parent 
with a substantial parent-child relationship seeking to accept the 
responsibilities of parenthood.39 Likewise, in Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health,40 a case concerning whether parents may terminate life-
sustaining nutrition and hydration for their terminally ill adult child 
who was in a persistent vegetative state, Justice Scalia characterized 
the case as one about the right to assisted suicide,41 rather than the 
more general, and well accepted, right to be free from unwanted 
medical intervention.42 
Under the static view of tradition held by Justices White and 
Scalia, Court precedents that might support a claimed right are also 
read narrowly. Thus, prior decisions protecting rights to intimate 
conduct between consenting adults, to procreation, and to possess 
obscene material in the privacy of one’s home, are limited in order to 
distinguish these established rights from the claim of consenting 
adults of a right to be free in their sexual relationships in the privacy 
of their own homes.43 Similarly, prior decisions securing rights for an 
unmarried father who developed a relationship with his child are 
narrowed in Michael H. v. Gerald D.44 to the context of the “unitary 
 
 37. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 38. Id. at 123.  
 39. Id. at 142–46 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the nature of the parent-child 
relationship without regard to marriage and objecting to the plurality’s repeated references to 
the “adulterous natural father”) (quoting the plurality opinion (emphasis added)). 
 40. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 41. Id. at 294–97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding the petitioner’s case to be legally 
indistinguishable from “ordinary suicide”). 
 42. Id. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 43. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91, 195 (1986) (“[N]one of the rights 
announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the [right at issue]. No connection between 
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been 
demonstrated . . . .”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 44. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
BARTLETT IN PRINTER PROOF REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2012  2:55 PM 
544 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:535 
family,”45 and precedents relating to bodily integrity are limited in 
Cruzan by the state’s tradition of prohibiting assisted suicide.46 
In contrast to the narrowing of constitutional claims and the 
precedents that might support them, the traditions drawn upon to 
support the challenged legislative acts are defined broadly. In 
Lawrence, Justice Scalia drew upon an undifferentiated history of 
antisodomy laws to support broadly a state’s right to ban homosexual 
sodomy, even though some of those bans—like those on heterosexual 
sodomy—would be unconstitutional under the Court’s prior family-
privacy precedents.47 In Michael H., Justice Scalia defined broadly the 
common-law presumption of the legitimacy of a child so as to support 
the application of the California statute, even though the fact 
presumed could be scientifically disproved by a blood test and 
notwithstanding prior Court precedents about the rights of a father 
who has formed a relationship with his child.48 A history of statutes 
prohibiting suicide provides cover in Cruzan for state statutes that 
constrict the ability of individuals to make end-of-life decisions for 
family members, notwithstanding common-law traditions relating to 
medical decisionmaking and family autonomy.49 
An advantage claimed by the Justices who adhere to this 
particular tradition-based method for deciding substantive due 
process cases is that it avoids subjective value judgments by courts. 
When courts are limited to measuring a constitutional claim against 
the existence of a long-established tradition, their own personal views 
of the tradition do not enter into the calculation. “[B]eyond all 
serious dispute,” Justice Scalia wrote in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,50 the historical method he employs “is much less subjective, 
and intrudes much less upon the democratic process,” than the 
alternative “vague ethico-political First Principles whose combined 
conclusion can be found to point in any direction the judges favor.”51 
 
 45. Id. at 123. 
 46. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279–80.  
 47. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 595–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 215–18 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding it “perfectly clear” that certain historical antisodomy statutes 
would be unconstitutional under the Court’s family-privacy precedents). 
 48. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125–30 (plurality opinion) (interpreting the Court’s 
precedents to be inapplicable to a father’s assertion of “rights over a child born into a woman’s 
existing marriage with another man”).  
 49. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294–95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing prohibitions on assisted 
suicide and concluding that the petitioner did not have a fundamental right to suicide).  
 50. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 51. Id. at 3058 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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He has strong words for those Justices ready to identify new rights 
based on such First Principles, accusing members of the Court 
supporting the result in Lawrence, for example, of “tak[ing] sides in 
the culture war,”52 “sign[ing] on to the so-called homosexual 
agenda,”53 and risking “massive disruption of the current social 
order.”54 This critique is possible only from the standpoint that 
tradition is objectively discernible and unchanging. Indeed, Justice 
Scalia believes that the historical method is so reliable that it should 
be the “primary determinant of what the Constitution means”—even, 
say, the Equal Protection Clause.55 
Another feature of this historical method is that, because 
tradition is frozen, Court rulings based on it are permanent. In 
Cruzan, for example, Justice Scalia made clear that there is no right, 
now, or at any time in the future, to challenge any state regulation 
regarding end-of-life matters. Regardless of the facts of the case, 
changed circumstances, or evolving attitudes since early common law, 
this line of rights is a permanent dead end in the courts. Tradition sets 
the course. “[F]ederal courts have no business in this field . . . .”56 
“[T]he Constitution has nothing to say about the subject.”57 Period. 
2. The Critique.  Notwithstanding the appeal of a fixed, 
discernible view of tradition as a limiting principle for substantive due 
process, tradition does not provide an objective basis for deciding 
substantive due process claims. As will be examined more fully in 
Part II, tradition cannot serve that role because of its inherently fluid 
and evasive characteristics. Tradition is not fixed, nor can it be easily 
or reliably retrieved. It represents not fixed facts, but accumulated 
values that cannot be ascertained through some precise, scientific 
method. Perhaps most especially, tradition cannot be determined 
solely by looking at the past. It is, instead, an iterative phenomenon 
 
 52. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 591; see also id. at 586–92 (arguing that Lawrence was much more likely to cause 
disruption of social order than the overruling of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), would have 
caused in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), even 
though avoiding such disorder was used as a justification for Casey’s refusal to overrule Roe, see 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (plurality opinion)).  
 55. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 505, 570, 574–75 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 56. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 300. 
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that accumulates over time, with repeated affirmations, revisions, and 
instantiations. 
Justice Scalia’s opinions, themselves, reflect the flexibility 
offered by the categories upon which he relies to create certainty. To 
take just one example, Justice Scalia opposed the biological father’s 
claim to paternal rights in Michael H. because that claim was contrary 
to the interests of the unitary family—the mother, husband, and 
child.58 Yet in the later case of Troxel v. Granville,59 Justice Scalia 
voted to reject the right of parents in a unitary family to resist 
visitation by third-party grandparents under a Washington statute 
allowing such visitation if the court concludes that it is in the child’s 
best interests.60 
One might conclude that Justice Scalia is consistent in that he 
simply rejects the identification of new constitutional rights when 
doing so would defeat the will of legislatures. This consistency is 
belied, however, by Justice Scalia’s willingness in McDonald to sign 
on to the majority’s identification of a right to possess handguns in 
one’s own home on the basis of historical evidence no more or less 
mixed than the evidence in cases in which he rejected substantive due 
process claims. McDonald concerned a Chicago law restricting the 
possession of handguns. The question in McDonald was whether the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms is so sufficiently fundamental 
to our “scheme of ordered liberty” that it should be incorporated as a 
matter of substantive due process to invalidate the restrictions in 
question.61 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Alito purported to 
track Justice Scalia’s approach in Lawrence, Michael H., and Cruzan. 
“The relationship between the Bill of Rights’ guarantees and the 
States must be governed by a single, neutral principle”—tradition.62 
Yet here, instead of defining the claimed right and applicable 
precedent narrowly to defeat the claim, Justice Alito defined the 
claimed right—and the tradition upon which it is based—broadly, as 
the “right to keep and bear arms”63 and the right to self-defense,64 in 
 
 58. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 59. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 60. Id. at 91–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas suggested that he would have gone 
further and overruled the Court’s substantive due process decisions as exceeding the “original 
understanding of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 61. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1986)).  
 62. Id. at 3048 (plurality opinion). 
 63. Id. at 3042 (majority opinion). 
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order to uphold the claim. These are rights, Justice Alito wrote, that 
“the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
counted . . . among those fundamental rights necessary to our system 
of ordered liberty.”65 And whereas judicial interest balancing is 
ordinarily inappropriate and deference to legislative interests to 
determine the will of the people is paramount,66 in McDonald—which 
involved gun rights—these interests must bow to the Court’s 
understanding of the meaning of the broad rights of self-defense that 
it identifies. 
Justice Alito, like Justice Scalia, writes with a certitude in 
substantive due process cases that is not unrelated to the particular 
view of tradition upon which this certitude is based. If tradition is 
discernible and unchangeable, it can be reliably and objectively 
identified. It is difficult to escape, though, the amount of discretion 
these conservative Justices exercise when deciding whether or not a 
right is, or is not, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. 
In Michael H. and Bowers, Justices White and Scalia defined 
narrowly the claim and the relevant tradition so that they did not 
match, as discussed above,67 notwithstanding other ways that both the 
claim and the tradition might have been characterized. In McDonald, 
Justice Alito defined the claimed right broadly—as a “right of self-
defense” and the “right to keep and bear arms.”  So defined, this right 
matched perfectly the broad statements he had retrieved from 
constitutional ratification debates and various secondary sources 
about these same rights,68 and made the long and more detailed 
history of restrictions on gun ownership described in Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion seem irrelevant.69 It is this kind of slipperiness that 
leaves this method vulnerable to the frequent criticism that it creates 
 
 64. Id. at 3036. 
 65. Id. at 3042; see also id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing the incorporation 
of the Second Amendment right to bear arms as a “straightforward application of settled 
doctrine”). 
 66. See id. at 3047 (plurality opinion) (explaining that “judicial interest balancing” was 
expressly rejected by the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008)). 
 67. See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.  
 68. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036–42 (majority opinion). 
 69. Compare id. at 3036–44 (relying on general statements in favor of the historical right to 
keep and bear arms), with id. at 3120–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing an extensive list of 
specific gun regulations).  
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plenty of openings for judges to “smuggle[]” their personal 
preferences into substantive due process analysis.70 
The failure to engage alternative histories and traditions gives 
weight to the general observation some have made that originalism is 
less a coherent or compelling jurisprudence than a “political practice” 
that seeks “to forge a vibrant connection between the Constitution 
and contemporary conservative values.”71 The point is neither that the 
values identified by conservatives are wrong, nor that some other 
method would be more objective. It is, rather, that Originalists make 
false claims about the nature of tradition. To be supported by 
tradition, properly understood,72 values must not only be rooted in the 
past but must also resonate today. That resonance needs to be 
justified, not preemptively accepted as yesterday’s truth. 
For the same reason, contemporary standards alone do not offer 
a more objective or more satisfying basis for substantive due process 
decisions. Section B explores a jurisprudence that leans too heavily 
on the present, to the exclusion of the past. 
 
 70. See id. at 3118 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] limitless number of subjective judgments 
may be smuggled into [Justice Scalia’s] historical analysis.”); id. at 3116–17 (challenging the 
neutrality of Justice Scalia’s historical method and noting the inherently subjective process of 
framing an issue and selecting and synthesizing historical sources). This criticism parallels 
similar objections by Justices in other cases. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137 
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The pretense is seductive; it would be comforting to believe 
that a search for ‘tradition’ involves nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated than poring 
through dusty volumes on American history.”). Even Justices who, too, have applied a narrow 
“historical” version of substantive due process dispute its objectivity when they disagree about a 
result. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) 
(“What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable, which of them deserve the 
protection of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable.”); see also Bartlett, supra note 9, 
at 318–19 (arguing that the tradition is not an objective standard, but instead has been used to 
advance a particular substantive agenda); Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE 
L.J. 177, 221 (1993) (“Tradition is no longer, if it ever was, the powerful iconic beacon of 
societal truth, but is more accurately an apologia invoked to defend some predetermined (and 
unacknowledged) choice.”); cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice: 
The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 569 (2006) (arguing that originalism 
is a political practice rather than a compelling jurisprudence); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. 
Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1066 (1990) 
(arguing that the level of generality of claimed rights in substantive due process analysis is often 
based on conclusions judges seek to reach).  
 71. See Post & Siegel, supra note 70, at 569.  
 72. See infra Part II. 
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B. Tradition as “Steeped in Prejudice and Superstition” 
1. The Model.  If some conservative Justices believe in a fixed, 
unmediated past suited as a sole guide for individual-liberty rights, 
some liberal Justices have been overly dismissive of the past, while at 
the same time sharing with the conservative Justices a view of 
tradition as distinct from and contrary to present norms and 
circumstances. Justice Brennan exemplifies this dichotomous, 
antitradition view. Although this theory of tradition is less developed 
than that of Justice Scalia, to Justice Brennan, a Constitution whose 
interpretation is tied to tradition is “a stagnant, archaic, hidebound 
document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long 
past.”73 Justice Ginsburg believes, as well, that tradition represents 
this nation’s “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination”74 
and outdated, “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of 
males and females.”75 
Because these liberal views tend to associate tradition with 
injustice rather than with fundamental freedoms, those who hold 
these views do not believe that the Court should be bound by 
tradition in giving meaning to substantive due process.76 Tradition is 
not the anchor for constitutional liberty interests, but, in many cases, 
its antithesis. Thus, although in his opinions Justice Brennan is 
sometimes able to identify a tradition supporting a substantive due 
process claim,77 the ultimate question for him is not whether a specific 
right has always been protected but whether, guided “by our prior 
cases and by common sense,” a particular claim is “close enough to 
the interests that we already have protected to be deemed an aspect 
of ‘liberty’ as well.”78 Justice Blackmun, similarly, insists in his 
opinions that substantive due process is not about “blind imitation of 
 
 73. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 74. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).  
 75. Id. at 541–42 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. This thought is often attributed to Justice Holmes. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“It is revolting to have no better reason for 
a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 305 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (citing common-law tort principles of trespass and battery as evidence that the right 
to be free from unwanted medical attention is deeply rooted). 
 78. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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the past”79 but rather about determining the values that underlie the 
Court’s prior precedents.80 
In determining whether a liberty interest should be extended, the 
Court’s most liberal members tend to characterize claims broadly, to 
facilitate connections with relevant precedents and thereby support 
expanded individual rights. For example, whereas Justices White and 
Scalia viewed the claims at issue in Bowers and Lawrence as the 
“right to engage in homosexual sodomy,” Justice Blackmun saw it 
more broadly as the right of individuals “‘to be let alone’ . . . to decide 
for themselves whether to engage in particular forms of private, 
consensual sexual activity.”81 Similarly, whereas Justice Scalia treated 
the issue in Cruzan specifically as the lawfulness of the state 
“interfer[ing] with bodily integrity to prevent a felony,”82 including 
suicide, Justice Brennan addressed the “right to be free from medical 
attention without consent.”83 
The Justices who refuse to be governed by a stationary view of 
tradition also tend to construe traditions and prior precedents more 
broadly. Thus, whereas Justices White and Scalia in Bowers and 
Lawrence looked only to the existence of antisodomy laws at the time 
of the Framers and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Justice Blackmun in Bowers rejected early law as a basis to deny 
freedom in the present,84 and generously interpreted prior Court 
precedents to protect such things as “a way of life,” “harmony in 
living,” “the ability independently to define one’s identity,” 
“development of the human personality,” “giving individuals freedom 
to choose how to conduct their lives,” and “special protection for the 
individual in his home.”85 In Michael H., whereas Justice Scalia cited 
 
 79. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Holmes, supra note 76, at 469) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 80. Id.; see also id. at 210 (“[N]either the length of time a majority has held its convictions 
[n]or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court’s 
scrutiny.”).  
 81. Id. at 199 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).  
 82. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 298 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
790 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments) (stating that the issue raised by 
Washington’s ban on physician-assisted suicide is the “right to die with dignity” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 84. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199, 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 205–07; see also id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (looking broadly to the 
“American heritage of freedom,” which consists of “the abiding interest in individual liberty 
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early common law relating the presumption of legitimacy and 
narrowly construed Supreme Court precedents to apply to the 
“unitary family,”86 Justice Brennan interpreted those precedents to 
support the rights of parents and families, broadly defined.87 These 
precedents, for Justice Brennan, demonstrate that our society is not a 
homogeneous one that recognizes only one legitimate family form, 
but rather a facilitative and pluralistic one.88 In the end, for Justice 
Brennan, the general tradition in support of parenthood89 is the more 
important tradition to emphasize in determining “the kind of society” 
we are, and wish to be.90 
Whereas the historical method favored by Justice Scalia and 
other conservative Justices makes changed circumstances irrelevant 
to substantive due process, the more liberal Justices believe that the 
Court should take changed circumstances into account in deciding 
what values and rights are fundamental to our way of life. In the 
context of the conclusive presumption at issue in Michael H., for 
example, Justice Brennan pointed out that blood tests now exist that 
can determine paternity virtually beyond a shadow of a doubt, 
making it unnecessary to achieve the necessary certainty through a 
legal fiction.91 Likewise, in considering the right to physician-assisted 
suicide, Justice Brennan found relevant the vastly increased 
availability of life-prolonging medical technologies, current medical 
practices relating to use of heroic measures, and the growing use of 
living wills and health-care powers of attorney—all of which change 
the context in which expectations relating to patient control of end-
of-life decisions are evolving.92 
Because tradition requires interpretation, not simple retrieval, 
reason and judgment are an important part of the liberal 
methodology. Justice Brennan reasoned in Cruzan, for example, that 
although the state has a legitimate interest in preserving life, it can 
have “no legitimate general interest in someone’s life, completely 
 
that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen’s right to decide how he will live his own life 
intolerable” (citations omitted)).  
 86. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123–25 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 87. Id. at 137–47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 88. Id. at 141.  
 89. Id. at 139. 
 90. Id. at 141.  
 91. Id. at 140. 
 92. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 314, 320–25 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
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abstracted from the interest of the person living that life.”93 Justice 
Brennan explained why a person would not want to continue on life 
support (pride, abhorrence of an “ignoble end,” humiliation, desire 
for dignity);94 why Missouri’s rule was counterproductive (it will make 
doctors and families more reluctant to initiate life-sustaining 
measures that they then will not be allowed to terminate, even at the 
family’s request);95 why, although a living will may be the only way to 
satisfy Missouri’s requirements, most people do not make living wills 
(a wish to avoid dwelling on their own “deterioration and mortality,” 
a lack of awareness of how to create a living will);96 and why 
Missouri’s failure to recognize testimony from family and friends 
about what a patient would have wanted makes factfinding less, 
rather than more, reliable (usually no one knows the patient better).97 
In contrast to Justice Scalia’s reliance on tradition divorced of its 
underlying rationale or any countervailing, contemporary norms and 
values, what counted for Justice Brennan’s opinion were general 
propositions that found support in precedent, reason, and present 
circumstances. 
Justice Ginsburg shares Justice Brennan’s skeptical view toward 
tradition, but the two Justices differ in their treatment of substantive 
due process. Whereas Justice Brennan attempted to use substantive 
due process largely set free from tradition in favor of the expansion of 
individual liberty rights, Justice Ginsburg has never fully embraced 
substantive due process as an independent source of individual 
rights.98 In cases decided in favor of substantive due process claims, 
Justice Ginsburg has mostly signed on to opinions written by others 
rather than authored her own.99 When she has written for the 
majority, her approach to substantive due process has been to extend 
 
 93. Id. at 313; see also id. (reasoning that there are no third parties whose situation will be 
improved, or for whom harm will be averted, as a result of the state’s denial of Nancy Cruzan’s 
parents’ request).  
 94. Id. at 310–12. 
 95. Id. at 314. 
 96. Id. at 323–25. 
 97. Id. at 325. 
 98. For a similar observation, see Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and 
Equality in Relation to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086 (2009) (“Justice 
Ginsburg has continued to resist the temptation to use substantive due process . . . .”).  
 99. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 59 (2000) (joining Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 789 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., concurring 
in the judgments) (concurring for essentially the same reasons as Justice O’Connor).  
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past decisions based on logic and evolving norms.100 Given the choice, 
however, Justice Ginsburg has long favored equal protection over 
substantive due process analysis.101 The right to abortion, she states, 
would have been more secure on a foundation that incorporated the 
importance of the abortion decision to women’s equality.102 To Justice 
Ginsburg, autonomy and equality concerns are “intimately related,” 
with equality concerns the dominant ones.103 Accordingly, in resisting 
 
 100. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116–17 (1996) (finding unconstitutional on due 
process grounds the state’s denial of a mother’s right to appeal the termination of her parental 
rights when she could not pay the $2,400 record-preparation fee).  
 101. The conventional analysis is that substantive due process looks backward to protect 
established individual liberties against what Professor Sunstein calls “short-run departures” or 
“shortsighted deviations” from tradition, while equal protection looks forward, to invalidate 
practices, “however deeply engrained and longstanding,” that are determined to discriminate 
against disadvantaged groups. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note 
on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163, 
1171 (1988). By Sunstein’s view, substantive due process constitutes a limit on “dramatic and 
insufficiently reasoned change,” id. at 1171, while equal protection operates as a “criticism of 
existing practice”—a “protect[ion] against tradition[]” that is “self-consciously designed to 
eliminate practices that existed at the time of ratification . . . that were expected to endure.” Id. 
at 1174. Professor Laurence Tribe has made a similar contrast between the “properly 
conservative and suitably backward-looking” substantive due process doctrine and the “more 
aspirational domain of equal protection.” Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897 (2004). 
This distinction, while it may seem to help distinguish many cases, imposes a false dichotomy 
between past and present. In fact, a number of scholars in recent years, including Professor 
Tribe himself, have challenged this dichotomous view of substantive due process and equal 
protection, arguing that the two doctrines actually protect a convergent set of rights relating to 
dignity and self-government. See id., at 1897 (“Trying to make sense of the conclusions judges 
have reached by attending carefully to the rulings they have actually rendered in the name of 
substantive due process reveals a very different narrative. It is a narrative in which due process 
and equal protection . . . are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix. It is a single, 
unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity. This tale centers on a quest for 
genuine self-government of groups small and large, from the most intimate to the most 
impersonal.”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011) 
(“The introduction of a third overarching term like ‘dignity’ that acknowledges the links 
between liberty and equality is overdue. Too much emphasis has been placed on the formal 
distinction between the equality claims made under the equal protection guarantees and the 
liberty claims made under the due process or other guarantees.”). This convergent view is 
wholly consistent with an interactive view of past and present that evaluates past norms and 
practices in light of current commitments, including commitments to equality, and that evaluates 
present norms and practice in light of the traditions that give them shape and meaning. 
 102. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to 
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382–86 (1985).  
 103. Id. at 375 (arguing that “the shape of the law on gender-based classification and 
reproductive autonomy indicates and influences the opportunity women will have to participate 
as men’s full partners in the nation’s social, political, and economic life”). This view was 
included as part of the reasoning in Casey, although Justice Ginsburg was not a member of the 
Court when that decision was rendered. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
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the Court’s retrenchment in the area of women’s reproductive rights, 
Justice Ginsburg has veered away from the reasoning of an evolving 
substantive due process analysis. In her dissent in Gonzales v. 
Carhart,104 she cited the Court’s prior substantive due process cases as 
precedent, but invoked none of the reasoning supporting these 
precedents.105 Indeed, she denied that the case was about “some 
generalized notion of privacy,” instead shifting the right at stake to 
the “woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to 
enjoy equal citizenship stature.”106 
Justice Ginsburg uses her view of the past as oppressive in an 
affirmative way in her equal protection jurisprudence. In United 
States v. Virginia,107 for example, Justice Ginsburg used the history of 
public education in Virginia to refute Virginia’s defense of its 
exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI). 
Virginia’s claim was that the availability of the male-only VMI 
enhanced educational diversity in Virginia. In response, Justice 
Ginsburg pointed to Virginia’s tradition of excluding women from its 
institutions of higher learning to show that preserving VMI as an all-
male institution was part of a historical pattern of discrimination 
rather than a commitment to the benefits of educational diversity.108 
Virginia also claimed that the admission of women would undermine 
the strengths of the adversative training offered at VMI, because the 
same techniques could not be used in mixed company and would not 
work for women. Justice Ginsburg again recited historical facts to 
refute the claim: the U.S. military academies in response to the same 
skepticism successfully integrated women in the 1970s; if they could 
do so without compromising their rigor, so could VMI.109 
 
833, 852 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“The destiny of the woman must be shaped . . . on her own 
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”).  
 104. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 105. Id. at 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even in the course of citing the Court’s precedents, 
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes that her preferred rationale focuses on women’s equality interests, 
not the substantive due process rights on which those precedents are based. See id. (stating that 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006), “cannot be understood as 
anything other than an effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this Court—
and with increasing comprehension of its centrality to women’s lives”).  
 106. Id. at 172.  
 107. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 108. Id. at 536–40; see also id. at 538 (“[T]he historical record indicates [that the exclusion of 
women from the VMI was] more deliberate than anomalous.”).  
 109. Id. at 540–45, 551 (citing concerns of those who defended the exclusion of women from 
military academies and from the practice of law, and noting that these concerns have not come 
to pass); see also id. at 555 n.20 (stating that Virginia’s concern about the adversative training 
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2. The Critique.  Although Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and 
Ginsburg undertake a wholly different kind of substantive due 
process analysis than Justices White, Scalia, and Alito, their approach 
reflects a similar misunderstanding of tradition. Justice Brennan 
concedes that tradition is not “irrelevant” in substantive due process 
cases,110 yet his method of focusing on present realities and his 
consistently broad characterization of rights and precedents leaves 
little room for consideration of the role of the past in determining 
what rights are fundamental to our identity, or in securing those rights 
through connections to the past. According to Justice Brennan, 
tradition is a “theme” in prior cases, but it is the precedents 
themselves, as new facts present themselves, that provide the 
authority to move forward.111 Justice Ginsburg, too, sees tradition in a 
discontinuous way—fixed and unrelated to the present. Tradition is 
more a source of injustice than liberty. Like Justices Scalia and Alito, 
these Justices, too, fail to recognize the common process through 
which tradition is preserved and change occurs—namely, through an 
ongoing, inevitable process of selective transmissions from the past 
that are accepted and integrated into present norms under changing 
circumstances. They see past and present as competitive rather than 
interactive and potentially complementary. 
The dichotomous view of past and present not only is inaccurate, 
but it also prevents meaningful debate about basic questions of 
constitutional values. It is, in short, a conversation stopper. By 
rejecting the factors that mean the most to the other, the approaches 
of both ends of the Court are conversation stoppers. They reach 
conclusions about the most basic issues relating to personal identity, 
freedom, and liberty on their own, exclusive terms—terms that allow 
no meaningful mutual exchange between the two sides. In focusing on 
only the past or the present, these approaches not only fail to speak to 
 
method destroying a sense of decency between the sexes “is an ancient and familiar fear”). For 
a fuller analysis of Justice Ginsburg’s use of history, see Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-Viewing 
History: The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE L.J. 
237, 245–59 (1998).  
 110. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 139 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It is 
not that tradition has been irrelevant to our prior decisions.”). 
 111. Id. at 139 (“Throughout our decisionmaking in this important area runs the theme that 
certain interests and practices . . . form the core of our definition of ‘liberty.’ . . . In deciding 
cases arising under the Due Process Clause, . . . we have considered whether the concrete 
limitation under consideration impermissibly impinges upon one of these more generalized 
interests.”).  
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each other but also to the Court’s center, which tends to be more 
interested in the links between past and present. 
II.  BEYOND THE PAST/PRESENT DICHOTOMY 
The two views of tradition described in Part I are nearly 
diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive, reaching different 
conclusions through different starting points and methodologies. As 
such, they provide little common ground for discussion about what 
fundamental rights deserve constitutional protection under 
substantive due process. They are ships passing in the night. The 
problem is not simply that the Justices disagree about starting 
points—conservatives preferring past tradition and liberals preferring 
contemporary norms and reasoned judgment. It is that both sides 
view these different starting points as polar opposites, each unrelated 
to the other. These understandings create disputed territory between 
the Justices that is impassable. Conservatives believe that only deeply 
rooted traditions are relevant and that these traditions have no 
relation to current norms and values. Liberals, on the other hand, 
believe that reasoned judgment is what matters most and that 
tradition adds little—except perhaps window dressing—to this 
judgment. What one side finds dispositive is entirely irrelevant to the 
other. These are not the makings of a meaningful constitutional 
discourse.112 
A. An Integrative View of Past and Present: The Model 
There is a way to think about tradition that better captures the 
dynamics of tradition and thereby provides a more satisfactory guide 
to substantive due process analysis. This alternative view sees past 
and present as in motion and as part of a negotiation about who we 
are and what freedoms and liberties matter to us enough to have 
constitutional status.113 Tradition is a connection or link between past 
and present,114 rather than a choice between them. The past is what 
 
 112. Cf. Olympia J. Snowe, Opinion, How the Public Can Save the Senate, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 4, 2012 at A23 (describing Senator Olympia Snowe’s reasons for leaving the U.S. Senate, 
including the failure of leaders to find common ground and to live up to the Founding Fathers’ 
intentions for establishing the “greatest deliberative body in history”).  
 113. Bartlett, supra note 9, at 330; see also SHEILA ROWBOTHAM, THE PAST IS BEFORE US: 
FEMINISM IN ACTION SINCE THE 1960S, at 301 (1989) (arguing that “the future is behind us 
and . . . the past really is before us”).  
 114. For a discussion of common law and custom as the “extension of a pre-existing series,” 
in which “the agent who extends the series has, in theory, a range of options about the extension 
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the present redeems from its history; the present is what the present 
claims as its own. 
This richer view of tradition understands that traditions are 
multiple and varied, and do not speak with just one voice.115 Often 
traditions are “indeterminate, self-contradictory, incalculable, 
inexplicable, and generally elusive.”116 They are also found in multiple 
places, such as social practices, norms, and expectations—not simply 
in older versions of the very same legal rules and proscriptions that a 
lawsuit challenges.117 
A value or practice from the past earns recognition as a tradition 
when society chooses to bring it forward from the past into the 
present. In this sense, tradition is an inheritance, upon which a kind of 
evolutionary pressure is continually exerted,118 causing past 
commitments to be amended and reworked, in potentially creative 
ways.119 Deciding what constitutional rights should be protected by 
substantive due process is a matter of determining consciously, 
transparently, and respectfully what part of its past traditions the 
present should own for itself, and what it should not. This is not the 
kind of exercise that can be performed by a single, straightforward 
reading of historical evidence.120 
If tradition requires choices, it also requires constraints—both 
methodological and temperamental. Methodologically, the concept of 
tradition assumes that a people’s sense of identity changes not in 
sudden bursts but in incremental and iterative stages. Accordingly, 
judicial decisionmaking that builds on tradition is gradualist and 
minimalist. This means that decisions should be limited to the facts 
 
of that series,” see Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law, in THE 
NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 13, 23–24 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy 
eds., 2007). A similar concept, discussed by Professor Schauer, is Professor Ronald Dworkin’s 
metaphor for interpretation of the “chain novel.” See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228–
38 (1986).  
 115. See Krygier, supra note 6, at 242 (“[E]ven in constantly vetted traditions such as law, 
the past speaks with many voices.”).  
 116. Brown, supra note 70 at 222.  
 117. Bartlett, supra note 9, at 314. 
 118. See F.A. HAYEK, The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science, in 
THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 318, 318 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984) (explaining 
his view that “cultural evolution operates chiefly through group selection”).  
 119. Krygier, supra note 6, at 256.  
 120. See Rebecca L. Brown, History for the Non-Originalist, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 69, 
71 (2003) (“The kinds of questions that tend to arise in constitutional interpretation, and on 
which historical evidence might be helpful, tend not to be the kinds of questions that can aspire 
to truth.”).  
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directly before the court and should not preclude future 
decisionmaking in contexts that may implicate different values and 
considerations. 
Temperamentally, this view of tradition calls for prudence, 
caution, and humility. Judges determining whether a fundamental 
constitutional right has emerged are obliged to try in good faith to set 
aside their own subjective values, in favor of those evident in both our 
inherited past and our evolving present. This requires “judgment”121 
from “judicial statesmen” with both practical and social wisdom and 
an ability to understand the competing considerations that underlie 
the potentially relevant values.122 
A number of constitutional-law scholars have developed theories 
of constitutional interpretation that take seriously the interaction 
between past and present in a way that is consistent with these 
methodological and temperamental limits. Dean Larry Kramer, for 
example, critiques the “originalist” view of constitutional 
interpretation on the grounds that it assumes that “[t]here are 
Founding moments and the present—then and now—and little 
else.”123 In this critique, Dean Kramer argues that it is the job of 
interpreters of the Constitution to determine which competing 
interpretations of the Constitution make sense in light of what has 
happened since the Founding moments. “Subsequent history is 
essential to determine what our Constitution has become and to 
decide what it should continue becoming”—an inquiry that is both 
“grounded in the present” but also based on the “best sense” we can 
make of the “‘web of beliefs and practices’ we have inherited.”124 In 
seeing the act of interpretation as a synthesis of past and present, 
Kramer eschews the notion that interpretation chooses between the 
two. 
 
 121. Professor Jeff Powell makes the case that historical research itself requires the 
“constant exercise of judgment.” H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 
660 (1987); see also id. at 683 (arguing that “[h]istory yields interpretations, not uninterpreted 
facts”).  
 122. See Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 979 (2008) 
(“[S]tatesmanship charges judges with approaching cases so as to facilitate the ability of the 
legal order to legitimate itself over the long term by . . . expressing social values as social 
circumstances change and sustaining social solidarity amidst reasonable, irreconcilable 
disagreement.”).  
 123. Kramer, supra note 17, at 1628.  
 124. Id. at 1641 (quoting DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT 
THEORY 22–23 (1980)).  
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Scholars as otherwise diverse as Professors Ernest Young,125 Cass 
Sunstein,126 and David Strauss127 have linked this more synthetic 
notion of tradition in various ways with the thought of Edmund 
Burke. Professor Young advocates a “conservative” or 
“evolutionary” view of constitutional interpretation that he calls 
“common-law constitutionalism,” which approaches constitutional 
interpretation like other forms of common-law reasoning, starting 
with precedent as a “source of knowledge,” and responding to 
changing circumstances with “slow, incremental change” as opposed 
to “radical transformations.”128 Within this framework, tradition is not 
a fixed source of authority; rather, it is “determined from case-by-case 
adjudication, from judgments of similarity and difference to what has 
gone before—in short, from the tradition of readings and rereadings 
of authoritative materials that constitute the practice of constitutional 
stare decisis.”129 
Professor Young argues that Burke rejects rigid adherence to 
some originalist understanding at some discrete point in time of the 
sort advocated by Justices Scalia and Thomas.130 Burke also 
“downplays the efficacy of a priori rationalizations about law and 
justice,”131 “naked reason,”132 and “abstract notions of justice”133 
toward which opponents of tradition gravitate. Instead, Burke urges 
respecting the “lessons of history”134 over time, using “precedent, legal 
reasoning, collective deliberation,” and “reasoned judgment.”135 
 
 125. See Young, supra note 14 (arguing that modern judicial conservatism is anathema to 
the classically conservative political theory articulated in the writings of Edmund Burke). 
 126. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 353 (arguing that Burkean judicial philosophies oppose 
originalism). 
 127. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 885 n.23 (advocating a theory, which he identifies as less 
conservative than Burke’s, in which interpretations of the Constitution are driven both by the 
text and by a continually developing body of constitutional common law).  
 128. Young, supra note 14, at 622, 624, 688–89. For a critique of common-law 
constitutionalism, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the 
Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007), which argues that common-law 
constitutionalism is no more rational or efficient than statutes and other sources of law.  
 129. Young, supra note 14, at 700 (quoting Balkin, supra note 31, at 1624) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 130. Id. at 627–42. 
 131. Id. at 624. 
 132. Id. at 648. 
 133. Id. at 704. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 694 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) 
(plurality opinion)).  
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Professor Sunstein also praises Burkean minimalists, who unlike 
either originalists or perfectionists, “believe that constitutional 
principles must be built incrementally and by analogy, with close 
reference to long-standing practices.”136 Professor Sunstein links this 
form of gradualist minimalism with the restraint that judges refrain 
from deciding cases broadly and deeply, instead deciding one case at 
a time based on the facts before the court.137 Similarly, Professor 
Strauss applauds “rational traditionalism,” which “calls for 
recognizing the value of conclusions that have been arrived at, over 
time, by an evolutionary process.”138 Rationalist traditionalism gives 
the “benefit of the doubt”139 to past practice and text,140 but it tempers 
that deference with moral judgments about fairness, good policy, and 
social utility, which “have always played a role in the common law, 
and have generally been recognized as a legitimate part of common 
law judging.”141 
A highly influential statement of this view of tradition is Justice 
Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,142 a substantive due 
process case in which the Court declined to invalidate a state’s ban on 
contraceptives.143 In his dissent, Justice Harlan famously 
conceptualized a Burkean view of tradition that both respects the past 
 
 136. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 356. Professor Sunstein’s taxonomy distinguishes Burkean 
minimalists from originalists, who seek to recover the original meaning of the Constitution, 
from rationalist minimalists, who favor incremental steps but are often critical of tradition, and 
from perfectionists, who want to read the Constitution to accord with the highest political ideals 
(whether liberal or conservative). Id. Professor Daniel Conkle seems to suggest a similar 
theoretical breakdown in distinguishing between the “theory of historical tradition” upon which 
Justice White relies in Bowers and other decisions, the “theory of reasoned judgment” 
represented by the jurisprudence of Justice Blackmun in Roe and his dissent in Bowers, and the 
“theory of evolving national values” followed by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence, see Daniel O. 
Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63 (2006). None of 
Professor Conkle’s formulations are Burkean, however, in the sense that none of them combine 
tradition and reasoned judgment; instead, they each accept one version or another of the 
tradition-change dichotomy. 
 137. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 10–11 (1999) (“They decide the case at hand; they do not decide other cases 
too, except to the extent that one decision necessarily bears on other cases, and unless they are 
pretty much forced to do so.”). 
 138. Strauss, supra note 16, at 879. 
 139. Id. at 895. 
 140. Id. at 897. 
 141. Id. at 900. 
 142. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 143. The case was abrogated four years later by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 
(1965).  
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and recognizes its inevitably dynamic and evolving nature. 
“[T]radition is a living thing,” he wrote, representing the balance that 
our nation has struck between the “postulates of respect for the 
liberty of the individual” and “the demands of organized society.”144 
This liberty is not fixed as “a series of isolated points pricked out” in 
various areas, but is rather “a rational continuum.”145 Within this 
continuum, there are choices to be made between the traditions 
“from which [this nation] has developed” and “the traditions from 
which it broke.”146 Some traditions are worth preserving while others 
should be discarded. The necessity of choice does not mean that 
judges are “free to roam where unguided speculation might take 
them,”147 or to give rein to their “merely personal and private 
notions.”148 The Court must respect tradition, for pragmatic as well as 
prudential reasons. Decisions that show such respect are “likely to be 
sound,” whereas those “which radically depart[] from it could not 
long survive.”149 Judgment and restraint are critical components.150 
Each new claim should be “considered against a background of 
Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and 
historically developed. . . . The new decision must take ‘its place in 
relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to 
come.’”151 
This more dynamic, interactive view of tradition is both more 
open-ended and generative than conservatives allow, and more 
constrained than many liberals assume. The next Section 
demonstrates its application. 
B. The Interactive View of Past and Present: Applications 
Justice Harlan’s integrative view of tradition and liberty has 
formed the basis for a number of Supreme Court opinions in recent 
decades. The view of tradition reflected in these opinions is not 
outcome dispositive, in the sense that some of the opinions upheld 
state statutes against substantive due process attacks, while others 
 
 144. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 145. Id. at 543. 
 146. Id. at 542.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 544 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952)).  
 149. Id. at 542. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 544 (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting)) (last alteration in original).  
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invalidated such statutes. This Section analyzes opinions in three 
distinct subject-matter areas: (1) end-of-life decisionmaking, (2) 
private sexual behavior between individuals of the same sex, and (3) 
grandparent visitation. In each of these areas, I identify the features 
of the opinions that reflect an interactive view of past tradition and 
current norms, and suggest the benefits of this view. 
1. End-of-Life Decisionmaking.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion in Cruzan held that a state may constitutionally 
prohibit withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment unless there 
is clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent person would 
have wanted such withdrawal.152 Two of the opinions in this case—
already discussed153—either gave dispositive weight to history (Justice 
Scalia) or virtually ignored history altogether (Justice Brennan). The 
other opinions, in different ways and in various degrees, took a more 
nuanced approach. 
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Cruzan, directly took 
on the historical methodology employed by Justice Scalia, and in so 
doing, provides the fullest expression of a more interactive view of 
past and present. Issues of the magnitude raised in the case, he wrote, 
cannot be settled by categorical principles. The questions of 
“whether, and how, the Constitution protects the liberty of seriously 
ill patients to be free from life-sustaining medical treatment” should 
not be resolved “in the abstract.”154 Concrete details matter.155 History 
also matters, but it does not always provide consistent or controlling 
signals. In this particular case, Justice Stevens pointed out that the 
“[d]ecisions about prolongation of life are of recent origin.”156 History 
about life-sustaining medical treatment could hardly be dispositive 
when it is the case that “[f]or most of the world’s history . . . such 
decisions would never arise because the technology would not be 
available.”157 Medical advances have created a new problem, changing 
the circumstances under which any historical precedent might be 
dispositive, or even relevant. 
 
 152. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990). 
 153. See supra notes 40–42, 46, 49, 56–57, 82–83, 92–97 and accompanying text. 
 154. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 155. See id. (“Our responsibility as judges both enables and compels us to treat the problem 
as it is illuminated by the facts of the controversy before us.”).  
 156. Id. at 336 (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 428 (Mo. 1988) (Blackmar, J., 
dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). 
 157. Id. (quoting Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 428 (Blackmar, J., dissenting)).  
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The issue of constitutional rights in this arena was complicated 
for Justice Stevens by the difficulty of describing the “precise 
constitutional significance of death.”158 According to Justice Stevens, 
the rights that attend end-of-life decisions are not “reducible to a 
protection against batteries undertaken in the name of treatment,”159 
as Justice Brennan suggested, nor do they necessitate a rejection of 
the value of or “desire for life,”160 as Justice Scalia claimed. It is 
impossible to categorize death in a way that easily disposes of the 
issue in the case because “not much may be said with confidence 
about death.”161 Indeed, the sanctity of life, including when it begins 
and ends, “is often thought to derive from the impossibility” of 
reducing it to a single measure like a physiological condition or 
function.162 What can be said, as with other questions that may depend 
upon when life begins,163 is as much a question of “faith” as anything 
else.164 For Justice Stevens, this fact “alone is reason enough to protect 
the freedom to conform choices about death to individual 
conscience.”165 
While he reached a different result, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, used reasoning more consistent with that of 
Justice Stevens than Justice Scalia. After surveying the common law 
relating to a competent person’s liberty interest in terminating 
medical treatment, the Chief Justice was concerned about extending 
the “logic” of prior cases to the refusal of treatment by an adult’s 
patient parents, because of “the dramatic consequences involved.”166 
In considering these consequences, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the 
“commitment to life” of “all civilized nations” evident in treating 
homicide as a serious crime and of the majority of states in 
 
 158. Id. at 343. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 345–46. 
 163. See id. at 343–50. 
 164. Id. at 343. 
 165. Id.; see also id. at 350 (“[T]here is no reasonable ground for believing that Nancy Beth 
Cruzan has any personal interest in the perpetuation of what the State has decided is her 
life. . . . [I]t would be possible to hypothesize such an interest on the basis of theological or 
philosophical conjecture. But even to posit such a basis for the State’s action is to condemn it. It 
is not within the province of secular government to circumscribe the liberties of the people by 
regulations designed wholly for the purpose of establishing a sectarian definition of life.”). 
 166. Id. at 279 (majority opinion).  
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criminalizing assisted suicide.167 In view of this backdrop, the Chief 
Justice concluded that a state’s desire to guard against potential 
abuses by requiring a determination regarding an incompetent’s 
wishes, as well as its refusal “to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of 
life that a particular individual may enjoy,” is not constitutionally 
unreasonable.168 All along the way, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
acknowledged the variety of sources, past and present, from which 
substantive due process rights might emerge,169 as well as the 
important values at stake on both sides of the issue.170 
In agreeing with the majority, Justice O’Connor, too, was not 
able to find the kind of consensus that would support the creation of a 
new substantive due process right. At the same time, however, she 
rejected the categorical approach that led Justice Scalia to the same 
result. In particular, Justice O’Connor expressed concern about the 
many legitimate issues relating to the termination of life-sustaining 
medical treatment that were not then before the Court.171 Recognizing 
that future cases may arise in different factual contexts, Justice 
O’Connor insisted that the Court’s opinion did not foreclose “a future 
determination that the Constitution requires the States to implement 
the decisions of a patient’s duly appointed surrogate” or that states 
may develop “other approaches for protecting an incompetent 
individual’s liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.”172 For 
Justice O’Connor, it was clear that these questions should not be 
resolved by categorical judgments about whether a right existed at 
some particular point in time or was compelled by some current well-
accepted doctrine. Each issue warranted its own balance of 
considerations taking into account past practice, current 
circumstances, and future issues yet to be fully defined. “As is evident 
from the Court’s survey of state court decisions,” she wrote, “no 
 
 167. Id. at 280. 
 168. Id. at 281–82. 
 169. See, e.g., id. at 269–82 (tracing state and federal common-law roots in the individual’s 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment and the state’s interest in safeguarding that 
decision).  
 170. See, e.g., id. at 286 (“Close family members may have a strong feeling—a feeling not at 
all ignoble or unworthy, but not entirely disinterested, either—that they do not wish to witness 
the continuation of the life of a loved one which they regard as hopeless, meaningless, and even 
degrading. But there is no automatic assurance that the view of close family members will 
necessarily be the same as the patient’s would have been had she been confronted with the 
prospect of her situation while competent.”). 
 171. Id. at 289–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 172. Id. at 292. 
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national consensus has yet emerged on the best solution for this 
difficult and sensitive problem,” making them, for the moment, 
especially suited to be “entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States.”173 
Cruzan was followed seven years later by Washington v. 
Glucksberg,174 which tested the constitutionally of Washington’s ban 
on assisted suicide. This time, opinions by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Stevens and Souter reflect in various ways the Burkean 
methodology evident in Justice Stevens’s and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinions in Cruzan.175 First, all of the various opinions 
assumed that the kind of question raised by the case was not settled 
through absolute principles derived from some fixed past or from 
reasoned judgment in the present, but rather, in Justice Souter’s 
words, through a weighing of “clashing principles” “within the history 
of our values as a people.”176 Each opinion also acknowledged the 
importance of the ongoing debate over end-of-life decisions and the 
difficult legal issues that these decisions raise.177 None suggested that 
the case be decided by a single, trumping principle. 
This respect for the past that does not forever settle the 
questions of what values are fundamental for the future is inherent in 
the common-law method. As stated by Justice Souter, 
 
 173. Id. (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(same). 
 174. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
 175. Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to state that she agreed “substantially” with Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion. See id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgments). 
 176. See id. at 764 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also, e.g., id. at 727–28 
(majority opinion) (“That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause 
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all 
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 745–
46 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments) (“The state interests supporting a general rule 
banning the practice of physician-assisted suicide do not have the same force in all cases.”); cf. 
id. at 736–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that although the majority looked to “our 
Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices,” there is no generalized right to commit suicide 
because of “[t]he difficulty in defining terminal illness and the risk that a dying patient’s request 
for assistance in ending his or her life might not be truly voluntary”).  
 177. Id. at 720 (majority opinion) (“[W]e ‘ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the 
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this 
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Collins v. 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))); id. at 738 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“As the Court 
recognizes, States are presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physician-
assisted suicide and other related issues.”); id. at 752 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments) 
(“There remains room for vigorous debate about the outcome of particular cases that are not 
necessarily resolved by the opinions announced today.”); id. at 784 (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“[T]he knowing and responsible mind is harder to assess.”). 
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[T]he value of common-law method . . . [is that it] is suspicious of 
the all-or-nothing analysis that tends to produce legal petrification 
instead of an evolving boundary between the domains of old 
principles. Common-law method tends to pay respect instead to 
detail, seeking to understand old principles afresh by new examples 
and new counterexamples.178 
Second, the view of tradition reflected in these three opinions is 
complex and interactive. Tradition is given meaning through present 
choices that are, themselves, shaped by changing circumstances. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion is the most explicit in this regard. It 
canvassed a broad swath of relevant traditions from the thirteenth-
century common law to contemporary state laws,179 acknowledging 
both that bans on assisted suicide are deeply rooted and that the 
“bans have in recent years been reexamined” (“and, generally, 
reaffirmed”).180 It also then described changing circumstances and 
evolving practices that may be relevant to current norms, including 
living wills, surrogate health care decisionmaking, and the withdrawal 
or refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment.181 It acknowledged that 
the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have 
never been “fully clarified” and “perhaps [are] not capable of being 
fully clarified,” but instead have needed to be “carefully refined by 
concrete examples.”182 Accordingly, the Court did not “find” tradition 
in some fixed past. Rather, it “inquire[d] whether th[e] asserted right 
has any place in our Nation’s traditions.”183 This inquiry requires a 
choice, not a simple excavation—a choice that requires consideration 
of both past and present. As Justice Souter remarked in his 
concurrence, “[t]he new decision must take its place in relation to 
what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come.”184 
Finally, the opinions in Glucksberg affirm that although the 
common-law method is gradual,185 movements in any particular 
 
 178. Id. at 770 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 179. Id. at 711–16 (majority opinion).  
 180. Id. at 716. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 722.  
 183. Id. at 723.  
 184. Id. at 770 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (quoting Poe 
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
 185. See, e.g., id. (“The [common law] ‘tradition is a living thing,’ albeit one that moves by 
moderate steps carefully taken.” (citation omitted) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
BARTLETT IN PRINTER PROOF REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2012  2:55 PM 
2012]    TRADITION IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 567 
direction are not inevitable. The possibility of a new constitutional 
right does not mean that one should be granted. Indeed, none of the 
concurring Justices urged the identification of a new fundamental 
right. After sympathetic analyses of the individual’s interests in 
making end-of-life decisions without interference from the state,186 the 
opinions examined the need for caution and the reasons why, in the 
case of this particular right, deference to state legislatures was best.187 
Small differences in context might warrant a different result. For 
example, the opinions suggested that the case would be a closer one, 
and may well have come out differently, if the state did not allow for 
sufficient dosages of pain-killing medication for terminally ill 
patients.188 In the next case or in a different context, the right in 
question might be better viewed as a more general “right to die with 
dignity,”189 rather than the more narrow formulation of the right to 
physician-assisted suicide.190 In this manner, the Glucksberg opinions 
explore issues without forcing a premature resolution of them,191 
explicitly continuing—rather than foreclosing—the ongoing debate 
on the nature of life-and-death decision making.192 
 
 186. See, e.g., id. at 777–79 (discussing respondents’ liberty interest in bodily integrity).  
 187. E.g., id. at 782–89; id. at 720 (majority opinion) (“[W]e have a tradition of carefully 
formulating the interest at stake in substantive-due-process cases.”); id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[E]ven assuming that we would recognize such an interest, I agree that the State’s 
interests . . . are sufficiently weighty to justify a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide.”).  
 188. See, e.g., id. at 736–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]n these States a patient who is 
suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to 
obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of 
causing unconsciousness and death . . . . [T]here is no need to address the question whether 
suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the 
suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives.”); id. at 790–92 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgments) (stating that because statutes at issue permit drugs for pain, this 
case makes it unnecessary to decide if there is a fundamental right to “die with dignity”).  
 189. Id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).  
 190. See id. at 723 (majority opinion) (“[T]he question before us is whether the ‘liberty’ 
specifically protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself 
includes a right to assistance in doing so.”).  
 191. See, e.g., id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that there is no reason to reach 
respondents’ narrower question in the context of the facial challenges at issue). 
 192. See, e.g., id. at 735 (“Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and 
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our 
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”); id. at 738 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments) (“The Court ends its opinion with the important 
observation that our holding today is fully consistent with a continuation of the vigorous debate 
about the ‘morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide’ in a democratic 
society. I write separately to make it clear that there is also room for further debate about the 
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2. Private Sexual Conduct Between Individuals of the Same Sex.  
While a number of the opinions in Bowers and Lawrence work from a 
dichotomous view of past and present,193 other opinions in these cases 
adopt a richer, more integrative view. Justice Stevens’s dissenting 
opinion in Bowers is one such example. According to Justice Stevens, 
past rules and attitudes are relevant to substantive due process 
decisions,194 but so are current attitudes and norms.195 The point of 
tradition is not to congeal past practices, but to provide the context 
for choosing among multiple, evolving possibilities of who we are as a 
society. As Justice Stevens pointed out in Bowers, the “tradition of 
respect for the dignity of individual choice in matters of conscience” 
is itself “[g]uided by history.”196 The focus of tradition is what is to be 
carried forward from the past, rather than what the past, at some time 
frozen in the past, forever compels. 
For pragmatic as well as doctrinal reasons, this view of tradition 
does not mean that courts are free to revise tradition continually to 
suit their own ideological agendas. Tradition operates as a real 
constraint. To repeat Justice Harlan’s words, “[a] decision of this 
Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a 
decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.”197 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence explicitly adopted 
Justice Stevens’s approach to tradition,198 extending it with the help of 
fuller briefing on the history of sodomy than the Court had in 
Bowers.199 Justice Stevens had noted in Bowers that traditional 
antisodomy regulations were directed against both homosexual and 
heterosexual sodomy.200 Under Griswold v. Connecticut201 and 
 
limits that the Constitution places on the power of the States to punish the practice.” (quoting 
id. at 735 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (citation omitted)). 
 193. See supra notes 24–36, 43, 47, 52–54, 79–81, 84–85 and accompanying text.  
 194. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Society has 
every right to encourage its individual members to follow particular traditions [relating to] 
expressing affection for one another and in gratifying their personal desires.”), overruled by 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 195. See id. at 219–20 (reasoning that because Georgia’s prohibition on private, consensual 
sodomy had not been enforced for decades, the state’s interest could not be characterized as 
important). 
 196. Id. at 217 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719–20 (1975)).  
 197. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 198. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78. 
 199. See id. at 567–71 (citing the aid of scholarly amicus briefs).  
 200. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 201. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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Eisenstadt v. Baird,202 any application of the statute to heterosexual 
couples would be unconstitutional.203 In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy 
noted further that “[i]t was not until the 1970s that any State singled 
out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine States 
have done so.”204 Moreover, the tradition of sodomy prohibitions 
upon which Bowers was based had been eroded, both statutorily205 
and in terms of the more recent decisions of Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey206 and Romer v. Evans.207 With 
these developments, the deficiencies of Bowers became clearer,208 and 
the connections between Casey and Romer and antisodomy statutes 
became more evident.209 
In the course of reversing Bowers, Justice Kennedy stated that 
Bowers was wrongly decided.210 Such an admission of error might 
have been necessary if substantive due process was a static doctrine, 
tethered to a fixed, discretely bounded concept of tradition, as 
Justices Scalia and Alito maintain.211 But, although an explanation of 
the Court’s reversal of its seventeen-year-old decision in Bowers is 
essential to explaining the decision, the confession that the Court 
erred in Bowers is misplaced, and apology was unnecessary. If 
tradition is a commitment the Court chooses, not discovers, its 
choices need not—indeed, sometimes should not—remain stationary 
over time. Because tradition is an evolving concept, what might at 
one time have been insufficient as a tradition to support an important 
liberty interest might later become sufficient, and vice versa. It is, 
perhaps, unfortunate that although the majority opinion reflects an 
interactive view of tradition, the Lawrence Court did not seem to fully 
appreciate or own that view. 
3. Grandparent Visitation.  One of the more interesting examples 
of an organic view of tradition is Troxel v. Granville. Troxel 
 
 202. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).  
 203. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 215–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 204. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570. 
 205. See id. 573 (pointing out that in 2003 only thirteen states prohibit sodomy, of which 
only four enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct).  
 206. Id. at 573–74, 576 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
 207. Id. at 574–76 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
 208. Id. at 573. 
 209. Id. at 564–67.  
 210. Id. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”). 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 31–45, 50–57, 61–69. 
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concerned the constitutionality of a Washington state statute broadly 
authorizing courts to grant visitation to a child by “[a]ny person,” 
even over the objection of the child’s parents, upon a determination 
that visitation was in the child’s best interests.212 Unlike Justice 
Scalia’s and Justice Thomas’s analyses of the case, mentioned in Part 
I,213 the other opinions in the case reflect an interactive role of 
tradition and change. Their method is deeply contextual, builds (at 
most) incrementally on past decisions, and refrains from bold 
holdings that decide more than is required (although there is 
disagreement about which questions need to be decided). As in the 
end-of-life decisions, the opinions differ on the way the case should 
be decided, and yet all exemplify a brand of common-law 
constitutionalism. 
Writing for a plurality of the Court in Troxel, Justice O’Connor 
surveyed the seventy-five-year evolution of Supreme Court cases 
developing the liberty interest of parents, highlighting the links 
between those prior decisions and the history and culture of Western 
civilization of which they were a part.214 She also examined the 
“changing realities of the American family”215 and the traditional 
statutory means by which states generally protect parental decisions 
on behalf of their children.216 She carefully dissected the lower court 
opinions to reveal that the trial court had simply disagreed with the 
mother, factually, about a matter that traditionally had been left to 
parents—what is in a child’s best interests.217 Finally, her opinion 
carefully limited its own reach to the particular statute at issue, as 
interpreted by the state supreme court. That court had held that the 
statute was unconstitutional because it did not require that harm or 
potential harm to the child be established before visitation was 
 
 212. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 213. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 214. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66 (plurality opinion).  
 215. Id. at 64. 
 216. See, e.g., id. at 70 (citing state statutes requiring consideration of whether visitation 
rights would interfere with the parent-child relationship).  
 217. Id. at 72. Justice Souter in a concurring opinion extended the analysis of the lack of 
deference that the trial judge gave to the parent’s choice in this case, in light of the traditionally 
protected constitutional rights of parents. See id. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring) (“It would be 
anomalous . . . to subject a parent to any individual judge’s choice of a child’s associates from 
out of the general population merely because the judge might think himself more enlightened 
than the child’s parent.”). 
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ordered over the objection of the parent.218 Justice O’Connor 
concluded that the best-interests standard gave too little deference to 
parents, but she reserved the question of what minimal additional 
limitations on the court’s power to order visitation over parent 
objection should be.219 At each step of the analysis, she clearly 
exposed what was at stake in the case, recognized that specific facts 
matter, and refused to recognize the past, or any other factor, as a 
trump. 
While Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy favored a different 
result in Troxel than Justice O’Connor,220 they shared her holistic 
approach to history, factual context, and reason. Justice O’Connor’s 
analysis took into account the historical premise of parents’ liberty 
interest in their children, which is that parents are presumed to act in 
the interests of their children.221 Exploring some of the same 
constitutional record, Justice Stevens underlined the potential for 
divergent interests between parents and children and the need for 
constitutional sensitivity to the children’s interests.222 Justice Kennedy 
also looked at history, precedent, contemporary practice, and 
criticisms of the best-interests test—finding the record 
“inconclusive.”223 He raised some common fact patterns that challenge 
the premise that parents will act in their children’s best interests, such 
as when the parents are not the child’s primary caretaker, or when 
those seeking visitation have no legitimate and established 
relationship with the child. These nontraditional circumstances are 
not to be judged as good or bad, Justice Kennedy explained, but as 
facts that might make a difference in future cases.224 
 
 218. Id. at 63 (plurality opinion). 
 219. See id. at 73 (holding that the statute’s unlimited rights for third-party visitation 
petitions were unconstitutional, but not reaching the question of whether harm must be a basis 
for third-party visitation statutes).  
 220. Justice Stevens would have overruled the lower court because he believed that the 
statute might still be interpreted in a constitutional way. Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Justice Kennedy would have overruled the lower court because he read the Washington 
Supreme Court opinion to say, wrongly, that the best-interests test is never appropriate in third-
party visitation cases. Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
 221. Id. at 65–73 (plurality opinion). 
 222. Id. at 87–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 223. Id. at 96–100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 224. See id. at 98, 100–02 (“Cases are sure to arise . . . in which a third party, by acting in a 
caregiving role over a significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which 
is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto.”). Justices O’Connor and Stevens also urged 
caution. See id. at 73–74 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“[T]he constitutional protections in 
this area are best ‘elaborated with care.’” (quoting id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting))); id. at 90 
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In sum, this set of opinions avoids absolute principles that deliver 
knockout punches. The opinions directly engage the values 
underlying the different sides of the case, showing how history, 
precedent, and contemporary realities help shape those values. The 
result is a transparent conversation that deepens rather than shuts 
down deliberation about what this society deems fundamental to its 
identity. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF AN INTEGRATIVE VIEW OF TRADITION 
An integrative view of tradition recognizes that substantive due 
process claims cannot be decided either by relying entirely on the 
past, or by ignoring it. Tradition is not sufficient to establish or to 
defeat a claim because it cannot be simply fast-forwarded to the 
present. Traditions are either accepted or rejected, in part or in 
whole, from among alternatives. Not to choose is not an available 
option. If the past is to matter, the choice must be understood in 
terms of the complexity of present circumstances and commitments.225 
If tradition does not define the content of substantive due 
process in any unmediated way, neither can tradition be rejected 
simply because it is tradition. Like tradition itself, an alternative to 
tradition also emerges from past practices and norms; no right can be 
deemed truly fundamental if it has not evolved from a past history 
and stood some test of time. As Professor Martin Krygier writes, “any 
particular ‘present’ is a slice through a continuously changing 
diachronic quarry of deposits made by generations of people with 
different, often inconsistent and competing values, beliefs, and views 
of the world.”226 This quarry forms a “stock” representing the 
“changing present of the tradition, to which each generation of 
participants contributes in turn.”227 The tensions and inconsistencies 
within this inventory called tradition make it necessary to choose, but 
the stock is not unlimited. 
There are a number of ways in which this view of tradition may 
be viewed as dangerous, result-oriented, and lacking a limiting 
 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the variety of family forms militates against a freestanding 
constitutional rule).  
 225. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567–72 (2003) (reviewing the history of 
sodomy regulations in light of the “emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”). 
 226. Krygier, supra note 6, at 242.  
 227. Id.  
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principle. In this Part, I identify and respond to some of these 
potential criticisms. I then return to the point that primarily motivates 
this Essay—that despite the potential problems inherent in this view 
of tradition, the interactive model both reflects what tradition actually 
is and how it is most relevant to substantive due process analysis. 
Pretending tradition works, or should work, otherwise neither makes 
it that way, nor improves the quality of decision making. 
One potential criticism is that an integrative view of tradition 
commits to political progressiveness, in that it will inevitably lead to a 
one-way, legislature-disregarding expansion of individual rights. This 
prediction comports with the hope and expectation of the liberal wing 
of the Court, which subscribes to a linear view of history.228 Present-
day politics as well as a host of Supreme Court decisions should 
remind us, however, that traditions do not necessarily evolve in a 
predictable fashion, or in a single “progressive” direction. I say this 
both as a corrective to conservatives and a warning to liberals. At one 
time substantive due process was seen to protect a contract freedom 
from work-hour and minimum-wage restrictions;229 later, that right 
was severely curtailed.230 Retrenchments in the areas of criminal 
 
 228. It is this view of history to which Justice Ginsburg subscribes when she asserts, citing 
historian Richard Morris, that “[a] prime part of the history of our Constitution . . . is the story 
of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded.” 
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (citing RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE 
FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 193 (1987)). This perspective may be more compelling 
with respect to equal protection rights than with substantive due process rights, see Tribe, supra 
note 101, at 1897 (emphasizing the progressive purpose of equal protection doctrine, in contrast 
to the inherent conservatism of substantive due process), although the expansion of equal 
protection rights seems to have stopped, at least for the moment, see Yoshino, supra note 101, at 
748 (noting the Court’s retrenchment against the trend of expanded equal protection). 
Professors Kenji Yoshino and Laurence Tribe argue that the two doctrines are converging. See 
Tribe, supra note 101, at 1898 (arguing that they are converging around the concept of self-
government); Yoshino, supra note 101, at 749 (arguing that they are converging around the 
concept of dignity). Insofar as the difference between equal protection and substantive due 
process has long been thought to be based on the distinction between protecting minorities from 
traditional discrimination and protecting past traditions, see Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 101, at 
1163, 1171 (observing that the Equal Protection Clause has been directed at historical 
discrimination, whereas the Due Process Clause “limit[s] dramatic and insufficiently reasoned 
change[] to protect tradition”), the convergence is consistent with a view of tradition that 
evaluates past norms and practices in light of current commitments, including commitments to 
equality, and evaluates present norms and practice in light of the traditions that give them shape 
and meaning. 
 229. E.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560–62 (1923) (striking down a 
minimum-wage law), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a work-hour restriction). 
 230. E.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 397.  
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procedure231 and reproductive rights232 also demonstrate that rights 
can shrink as well as expand. An interactive view of tradition means 
that rights will evolve both “backward” and “forward,”233 with stare 
decisis as a weight, but not an absolute brake in either direction. 
Today, for example, as national consensus builds toward acceptance 
of the liberty interests of gays and lesbians, it also builds toward 
greater protection for the fetus, and in favor of gun rights.234 
Depending upon one’s politics, the direction an issue is moving may 
be bad or good; either way, that direction helps determine who we are 
as a society, a determination which is the fundamental inquiry of 
substantive due process. 
Another potential criticism is that the integrative view of 
tradition introduces excessive indeterminacy in substantive due 
process cases. There is no denying that the doctrine offers more room 
to maneuver than most other provisions of the Constitution.235 But 
 
 231. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2267, 2269, 2275, 2278 (2010) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision turns Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),] 
upside down.”); Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to 
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 16–25 (2010) (reviewing Supreme Court precedents 
“gradually overruling” Miranda). 
 232. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132–33, 168 (2007) (cutting back on the 
abortion right in response to a facial challenge to a federal ban on partial-birth abortions). 
 233. It is not always clear, of course, which is which. Professors Reva Siegel and Jack Balkin 
have demonstrated how progressive law reform sometimes simply provides new frameworks 
within which old inequalities and injustices are maintained. For Professor Siegel’s theory of 
“preservation through transformation,” see Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the 
Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 77, 83 (2000); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife-Beating as Prerogative 
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2175–88 (1996); and Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 
1113 (1997). Similarly, Professor Balkin notes that “in each era people will try to use the logics, 
rhetorics, and doctrines of equality to preserve power, conserve privilege, and establish greater 
inequality.” JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN 
UNJUST WORLD 143 (2011). 
 234. Specifically on the argument why progressives who believe in a fundamental right to 
contraceptives and abortion should accept gun ownership as a fundamental right, Professor 
Akhil Amar writes that both are “simply facts of life, the residue of a virtually unchallenged 
pattern and practice on the ground in domains where citizens act freely and governments lie 
low.” Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 
185 (2008); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 246, 271 (2008) (“In many ways, Heller may be no less defensible than 
Griswold . . . .”).  
 235. Substantive due process is not unique, of course, in its indeterminacy. The Eighth 
Amendment prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment, for example, is keyed to “evolving 
standards of decency.” See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)(plurality opinion) (2005); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
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this should not be surprising, insofar as the doctrine is designed to 
protect something inherently indeterminate—namely, values. A 
holistic, integrative view of tradition confronts and embraces the 
values aspect of substantive due process, not because indeterminacy is 
preferred to determinacy—it is not—but because the protection of 
our fundamental values is an essential feature of our constitutional 
scheme, as even Justice Scalia concedes, at least when he is prepared 
the recognize a particular claim.236 If we are to respect that feature, we 
need to tolerate some looseness in the joints. Shining a light on the 
nature of tradition to show that past and present both are relevant to 
determining those values improves substantive due process by making 
it more transparent.237 Values are not avoided by relying solely on a 
fixed view of tradition; they are simply masked. Nor are they avoided 
by rejecting tradition altogether in favor of general principles of 
liberty and freedom; some limiting principle is necessary to ensure 
that constitutional protection is extended to only the most 
fundamental and basic components of our liberty. 
Additionally, it is important to note that an interactive view of 
tradition is not more indeterminate than the alternatives—except 
insofar as one might define tradition to predictably rule out, or accede 
to, most claims. Under an either/or view of tradition, Justices can 
easily defeat a claim by confining substantive due process analysis to 
the narrowest possible tradition and precedent, or by defining 
traditions and precedents broadly enough to support the 
identification of new rights. Both approaches are fully predictable 
from the method applied—but they are hardly free of judicial 
preferences. The plain truth of the matter is that defining values that 
 
15, 30–32 (1973) (announcing the “contemporary community standards” test for evaluating 
obscene material under the First Amendment). 
 236. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(agreeing with the majority opinion that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right). What 
Justice Scalia does not concede is that courts should have anything to do with determining those 
values. Id. at 3058. For a sampling of the voluminous scholarship demonstrating the complex 
interaction between legislation, public advocacy, and constitutional decisionmaking in setting 
constitutional values, see generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW 
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, 
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004); and Reva Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
 237. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3119 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging transparency in 
substantive due process cases). 
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are so important that they warrant a high level of constitutional 
protection is necessarily a difficult, value-laden enterprise. 
A related critique is that an approach not anchored in a fixed, 
ascertainable past is too subjective. The question is, again—subjective 
as compared to what? The debates over history in the opinions in 
McDonald and Lawrence make clear that neither past values nor 
present-day ones are self-evident. Ironically, taking account of both 
past and present together may provide greater determinacy and 
objectivity than taking account of either alone. Each can help act as a 
potential limit on the other. The past puts limits on what present 
norms warrant constitutional protection and the present constrains 
what past values are carried forward. Traditions that matter are those 
both grounded in the past and owned in the present. 
This more connected view of tradition will not necessarily result 
in fewer 5–4 votes. Besides the Justices’ opposing views on tradition, 
there are philosophical differences or “constitutional visions”238 that 
affect how Justices decide cases. Articulating those values in terms of 
the connection between past and present also will not reduce the 
vehemence with which these values are held. To the extent that 
values are deeply important, views toward them also will be deeply 
held. A fuller, engaged view of tradition will make clearer, however, 
that questions about fundamental liberties are not about accepting or 
rejecting tradition, but about ascertaining from our past and present 
who we are as a society. Being open about the value assumptions in 
such an analysis is a key ingredient of principled adjudication, and 
contributes to the transparency that is itself important to a 
constitutive societal dialogue about the meaning of liberty and 
freedom. 
CONCLUSION 
When judges are explicit and honest that questions of value 
cannot be decided on the basis of a single objective principle, they 
skip the charade that either tradition is a fixed measure of that 
principle, or that it is a useless anachronism to be rejected in 
substantive due process cases. The abortion debate is not about 
whether or not traditional “family values” should be preserved or 
rejected, nor can it be resolved either through the authority of a 
 
 238. See Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Values, 
43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 799, 803–04 (2009).  
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single, fixed “tradition” unmediated by present norms or through 
reason alone. It is about what role for the state best expresses our 
collective fundamental values about life, personal autonomy, and 
women’s place in society, as they have been passed forward from the 
past and accepted and revised in the present. A similar point can be 
made about such issues as gay rights, health care, immigration, and 
capitalism. This Essay’s approach demands of conservatives greater 
attention to current realities, the abandonment of “objective 
traditions to which no one attends,” and “subjective attachment to 
nonexistent pasts.”239 Of liberals, it asks for more serious 
investigations of the past that should be rejected,240 and for respect for 
the parts of our past to which society remains attached.241 The need to 
connect new claims to the familiar will make some claims more 
unlikely and others, perhaps, more appealing. In either case, it may 
make liberal advocates more pragmatic about the compromises that 
might be required for effective forward movement.242 
 
 239. The phrases are Professor Krygier’s. Krygier, supra note 6, at 256.  
 240. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. Professor Reva Siegel has done 
critically important work along these lines. See generally Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: 
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 261 (1992) (arguing that because abortion regulations were motivated by gender 
stereotypes, equal protection is the appropriate constitutional framework for examining 
abortion laws); see also Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims 
Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) (arguing that 
women’s claims for a joint property regime are not new claims, but rather were first made in the 
nineteenth century, as part of protests about the undervaluation of household labor). 
 241. Professor Cary Franklin’s effort to rediscover the roots of a non-formalist definition of 
sex discrimination in the legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 
No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2011)), is an example of how the affirmative excavation of history and tradition can 
have more potential pay-off than rejecting the relevance of the past. See Cary Franklin, 
Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2012).  
 242. Consideration of the residual values from the past may make us more pragmatic about 
other legal doctrines, including equal protection. For example, Professor Reva Siegel refutes the 
binary division of Justices between those who favor racial equality and those who do not, by 
explaining how “race moderates” sometimes allow civil rights initiatives and sometimes restrict 
them, depending upon the impact of those initiatives on social cohesion. Race moderates reject 
civil rights initiatives that offend whites and thereby set them against the rights of blacks, in part 
to avoid setting whites against blacks, or “balkanization.” Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness 
to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 
1278, 1297, 1300 (2011). The Court’s highly controversial opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. 
Ct. 2658 (2009), is one example of the antibalkanization principle, insofar as it represents the 
rejection of a city’s polarizing efforts to protect the rights of minority firefighters who had not 
done well on the city’s written promotion exams. Balkanization can be viewed as a consequence 
of a residual legacy of race discrimination to which race reformers should be sensitive—not just 
as a past to be defeated, but as the present synthesis of past and present that must be 
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Tradition deserves neither “undiscriminating praise [n]or 
blame.”243 It is a challenging concept that requires courts to wrestle 
with identifying the strongest and most valuable commitments of our 
past and present collective selves. That this is a contested undertaking 
fraught with value clashes does not mean that we should oversimplify 
tradition to avoid being overrun with substantive due process 
challenges, or that we should jettison the concept of tradition 
altogether. Tradition, properly understood, focuses us on the right 
question for substantive due process analysis; if we cannot always 




pragmatically taken into account. Along these lines, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on 
Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace 
Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2010). The sensitivity of “race moderates” to the impact of 
Court decisions on values that are carryovers from the past demonstrates the same kind of need 
for mediation of past and present as is present in the context of many substantive due process 
cases. 
 243. See Krygier, supra note 6, at 254–55.  
